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SOVEREIGNTY AS CURRENCY FOR OCEANIA’S  
ISLAND STATES
Lizzie Yarina
ABSTRACT
The sovereign archipelagos of the Pacific represent 
the distinctive typology of the ‘microstate.’ Emerging 
in the global post-colonial era, they are many of 
the smallest countries in the world in terms of both 
population and land area. Still, as independent 
states, each has earned a seat in the United Nations 
General Assembly, and other trappings of transna-
tionally recognized sovereignty. This essay explores 
the microstatecraft of Pacific Island nations—dis-
tinct transnational negotiations made possible, 
desirable, or necessary by the unique characteristics 
of these small island, big ocean states. In particular, 
microstatecraft refers to the opportunities created 
for these countries by leveraging their very status 
as states. Rather than a ‘development failure,’ this 
subversion of sovereign status can be seen as an 
astute strategy for self-determination, rejecting the 
inequities perpetrated by global neoliberalism. How 
does microstate sovereignty operate differently? 
This research article explores how Pacific Island 
micro-states use their sovereignty as a form of 
currency in the contemporary era, and considers the 
potentials in this mode of operation.
INTRODUCTION
The Pacific covers one-third of the area of the 
planet; 14 independent states and an additional 20 
remnant colonial territories comprise this expanse 
of ocean. The Pacific is occupied by a diverse set of 
island dwellers who have adapted to fluid, archi-
pelagic existences in concert with the powerful sea. 
However, the Pacific region, or Oceania, is sited in 
a kind of forgotten cartographic space, split apart 
by West-centric maps and divided in time by the 
International Date Line. In this under-looked zone 
of our planet a new state formation has emerged 
as an unintentional byproduct of state-building 
processes primarily designed by and for continental 
nation-states.
The island states of the Pacific embody a unique 
territorial typology: the microstate. Defined by 
the UN as nations with one million people or less, 
Pacific microstates only recently emerged during 
the post-colonial era. For the 11 independent small 
island states of Oceania—excluding the peripheral 
larger countries Australia, New Zealand, and Papua 
New Guinea, as well as offshore territories of larger 
states—the average population of these countries 
is less than a quarter of a million people within an 
average land area of 5,800 square kilometers. These 
are many of the smallest states in the world by both 
population and dry ground. The smallest, Nauru, 
has only 10,000 people inhabiting a single 10-
square kilometer island, much of which is no longer 
inhabitable as the result of phosphate mining. The 
combined surface area of these island microstates 
is similar to that of Rhode Island, as is the sum of 
their 11 gross domestic products, or GDPs. Still, as 
independent countries, each maintains a seat in the 
United Nations General Assembly and all of the other 
trappings of transnationally recognized sovereignty. 
This article explores the currency of sovereignty for 
Pacific microstates, and examines potential risks and 
opportunities associated with this ‘microstatecraft.’ 
In her book Extrastatecraft: the Power of Infrastruc-
ture Space, architectural and urban theorist Keller 
Easterling examines forms of alternative statecraft 
associated with the era of globalization. The epony-
mous term describes “the often undisclosed activi-
ties outside of, in addition to, and sometimes even in 
partnership with statecraft.”1 Various infrastructures 
including codes, zones, and networks provide the 
spatial softwares2 for these extra-state activities. 
Similarly, the spatial and structural characteristics of 
Pacific Island nations both explain their emergence 
as unlikely sovereign states, and their capacities 
for leveraging their statehood as a form of self-de-
termined development, or even anti-development. 
Independent archipelagic states are a specific typol-
ogy of ‘infrastructure space’: one created not by steel 
or standards but rather by the forces of geography. 
The space of islands becomes infrastructural as a 
product of their relationship to economic, social, 
and political systems and results in both local and 
global implications. 
The intentions of this paper are twofold. First, the in-
cluded microstatecraft cases demonstrate the collision 
of free market worldviews with the legal framework 
of the contemporary state, suggesting broader recon-
siderations of how we, as a global society, would like 
to imagine the roles of nations and markets towards 
the good of all civilizations. Second, for Pacific Island 
nations who have historically been at the mercy of 
colonial powers, and in some cases continue to expe-
rience the ramifications of neocolonial activities, this 
paper advocates for strategic and transparent lever-
aging of sovereign attributes by island state leaders as 
a mechanism for counteracting the negative forces of 
capitalist globalization while maintaining autonomy. 
This could be through manners suggested by the 
cases below or via as-yet unexplored ways. Coun-
tering framings of island microstates as small and 
vulnerable, this alternative ‘microstatecraft’ can push 
back against geographies of inequality established 
by continental, West-centric systems of economy 
and governmentality. ‘Irregular’ uses of sovereign 
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status are generally represented as signs of national 
instability in an international worldview; however, 
this paper argues that by subverting the colonial 
and neocolonial developmentalist models imposed 
upon them, these crafts are ingenious or even es-
sential tactics for nations that wish to maintain their 
autonomy and may have little else to leverage in the 
neoliberal global marketplace.
THE MODERN [PACIFIC] NATION STATE 
In the past, jurisdictional control was earned 
through power and expanded through conquest. 
Nation-states established sovereignty by military 
force and, in more recent history, commonly 
maintain authority through the workings of their 
economy. The modern formation of the nation-state 
emerged in Western Europe in the era following 
Renaissance restoration, as feudal society gave way 
to independent nations. Many cite the Treaty of 
Westphalia (164–89), which ended the Thirty-Years 
War, as the beginning of the era of the nation-state. 
This document “overturned the medieval system of 
centralized religious authority and replaced it with a 
decentralized system of sovereign, territorial states.”3 
Therefore, the nation-state model is a territorial 
mode of governance (state) which rules over a group 
of people with a shared culture or background 
(nation). The Western European nations who estab-
lished this model contributed to its gradual spread 
across the globe through colonization, conversion, 
and trade. 
A world of nation-states is composed of sovereign 
actors which “can exercise supreme authority within 
its own territorial boundary” and are “recognized 
by the other sovereign states and identified as an 
equal member of the international society.”4 Thus, 
the nation state must be defined by external forces 
as well as internal ones. This defining association 
of modern nation-states as we know it today was 
first established by the League of Nations (1919), 
following the first World War, and was followed by 
its current instantiation, the United Nations (1945). 
Through this system of association, worldwide 
models of the nation-state inform all other aspects 
of modern society: culture, education, science, 
business, and medicine. The societies composing the 
nation-state system “are structurally similar in many 
unexpected dimensions and change in unexpectedly 
similar ways,” following pre-ordained patterns of de-
velopment.5 These isomorphic tendencies are driven 
by world economic and political competition. In the 
context of a globalized world, culture, that aspect 
which might distinguish societies, “is of only margin-
al interest; money and force, power and interests, are 
the engines of global change.”6 External multilateral 
forces are thus the drivers of nation-state develop-
ment, not individual (i.e. microstate) actors within 
the system; statehood is a top-down societal force 
which self-reproduces through embedded structures 
and practices.
Under post-colonial late capitalism, national sover-
eignty has taken on new meaning as unlikely actors 
began to adopt the Westphalian model. Following 
World War II, Western nations began the process of 
decolonization in their Pacific Island colonies. For 
the century prior, the entire Pacific region had fallen 
under colonial mandates during the ‘Partition of 
Oceania,’7 although actual involvement of Western 
actors in their Pacific territories varied based on 
the quantity and quality of possible extractable 
resources, or siting in service of military strategies. 
For many Oceanic cultures, systematic Christiani-
zation, beginning in the nineteenth century, was the 
more powerful Westernizing force. Colonial actors 
re-mapped the Pacific, creating jurisdictions that 
grouped together geographically and ethnically 
distinct groups.8 As Pacific Island nations began to 
establish independence from colonial powers, par-
ticularly following the United Nations 1960 Dec-
laration of Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Powers and Peoples, some newly-sovereign national 
units re-established territories based on historical 
clan-based networks, such as the British colony of 
the Gilbert and Ellice Islands split into Polynesian 
Tuvalu and Micronesian Kiribati, but many of the 
eccentricities of colonial territorialization remained. 
For some island nations independence was a strug-
gle, and in several cases remains incomplete: my 
particular focus is on independent Oceanic states. 
These states formed parliamentary democracies 
modeled on their colonizers and enforced by UN 
metrics.9 As a paper written during the decolonizing 
period notes, traditional practices inhibited move-
ments towards the global nation-state model despite 
international pressures: “In much of Melanesia, the 
absence of traditional affiliations extending beyond 
the boundaries of minute communities—often 
limited to a single village or a group of contiguous 
hamlets—has inhibited the development of a sense 
of national identity.”10 In these islands, modern state-
hood often sits in a difficult balance with traditional 
social norms and organizations. 
In spite of these difficulties, the Western nation-state 
model persisted as the dominant form, no doubt 
01. Easterling, Keller. Extrastatecraft: 
The power of infrastructure space. 
Verso Books, 2014.
02. Easterling, Keller. “Zone: The spatial 
softwares of extrastatecraft.” Places 
Journal (2012).
03. Vaughan, Michael. “After Westphalia, 
whither the nation state, its people 
and its governmental institutions?” 
In ISA Asia Pacific Regional 
Conference (The University of 
Queensland, 2011).
04. Vaughan, “After Westphalia.”
05. Vaughan, “After Westphalia.”
06. Vaughan, “After Westphalia.”
07. Davidson, James W. “The 
decolonization of Oceania.” The 
Journal of Pacific History 6, no. 1 
(1971): 133-150.
08. Kempf, Wolfgang. “Chapter 10: 
Climate change, migration, and 
Christianity in Oceania.” In Climate 
Change and Human Mobility: 
Challenges to the Social Sciences, 
edited by Kirsten Hastrup, Karen 
Fog Olwig (2012): 235. Also see 
Macdonald, Barry. Cinderellas of 
the Empire: Towards a History of 
Kiribati and Tuvalu (Australian 
National University Press, 1982).
09. Vaughan, “After Westphalia.” Also see 
Lawson, Stephanie. Tradition Versus 
Democracy in the South Pacific: 
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(Cambridge University Press, 1996).
10. Davidson, “Decolonization,” 133-150.
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drawing upon legacy colonial structures and UN 
mandates. However, alongside Western models of 
governance, traditional chief systems and traditional 
laws also were sometimes implemented in parallel. 
For example, in Tuvalu, the council of elders or fal-
ekaupule maintains an advisory role in government, 
and on the rural outer islands a separate disciplinary 
framework exists for violations of traditional laws. 
In his comparison of postcolonial adaptation in the 
Solomon Islands and Fiji, Adrien Rodd illustrates 
varying ways frictions between indigenous and 
parliamentary governance systems are accommo-
dated (or not). In the Solomons, the difficulties of a 
parliamentary structure in the context of a culturally 
diverse nation led to a newly proposed constitution 
where, while the parliamentary system is reaffirmed 
at the federal level, increased cultural autonomy 
at the community level will be granted. This fed-
erated system attempts to accommodate the large 
socio-cultural gaps between the majority Melanesian 
population, with its multiple identities and languag-
es, and the state’s seven Polynesian Outlier islands. 
By contrast, in Fiji where earlier coups sought in-
creased indigenous power in response to perceived 
cultural threats posed by the large Indo-Fijian 
population (descended from indentured laborers for 
colonial sugarcane plantations), the current military 
government and their new constitution seeks racial 
equality under the law and eliminates traditional-
ly-derived structures such as the Great Council  
of Chiefs. 11
As opposed to other decolonizing sites where 
multiple groups rivaled for power, the geographical 
island-ness of some Pacific Island nations contrib-
uted to a clearer drawing of new state boundaries, at 
least as far as the (de)colonizers were concerned. The 
physical form of islands creates discrete spatial units; 
instead of fighting over borderlines, the question of 
where boundaries should be drawn was typically a 
much broader question of which islands to include 
(excepting American/Samoa and Papua/New 
Guinea). In Micronesia and Polynesia, this often led 
to a conflict-free self-determination process of which 
aggregates of islands—which often shared tradition-
al clan structures, language, and economies, even 
if they did not neatly identify as a nation—would 
translate into the new (nation-) state form. However, 
for some such as Nauru, Samoa, and Vanuatu, 
decolonization was a struggle. Greater cultural and 
language diversity in Melanesia, in part a product of 
larger island geographies whose volcanic landscapes 
create internal divisions, has led to ongoing contes-
tations, particularly on the island of Papua.
Notably, the process of decolonization can be 
considered incomplete in the Pacific; a number of 
territories are still under the jurisdiction of their 
colonial administrators. While the nature of these 
relationships varies, some indigenous islanders are 
still actively seeking independence for their states, 
particularly Kanaky (New Caledonia, FR), and 
Guam (US). Islands, particularly the islands of the 
Pacific with independent indigenous populations, 
are considered by some—including the UN Special 
Committee on Decolonization—to be one of the 
last vestiges of colonial imperialism. Furthermore, 
many ostensibly ‘decolonized’ nations can become 
victims of neocolonialism, where former colo-
nizers continue to exploit island states that are 
weak in traditional metrics of state power. This is 
visible in Australia’s operation of offshore asylum 
detention centers in three island sites across the 
Pacific, and the maintenance of US military bases 
in the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of 
Micronesia. However, as social scientist Godfrey 
Baldacchino argues, subnational island jurisdic-
tions perhaps more commonly prefer, and even 
advocate for, the right to remain affiliated with the 
metropole; for these islands, the microstatecraft of 
trading-in sovereignty in exchange for trade rights, 
aid, and protection may be preferable to conven-
tional sovereignty.12 
The sovereignties of Pacific Island microstates are a 
by-product of the modern system of transnational 
governance. Sovereignty was—and is still being—
established in Pacific Island nations in a unique 
context. In a totally distinct geographic and social 
environment than that from which the Westphalian 
state was initiated and resulting from a top-down 
colonization process and decolonization mandate, 
a new typology of nation-state was formed. This 
independence was protected, in spite of relative 
military and economic weakness by a condition 
of global stability following the Cold War. In the 
context of late capitalism, economic exploitation is 
typically favored as a state-growing process over 
territorial expansion, and with extremely limited 
economies and resources—in conventional terms—
Pacific Island nations have been allowed to persist 
with limited intervention. Granted autonomy by 
virtue of their geographic remoteness and distinct 
physical boundaries, statehood provides these tiny 
nations unique tools for influence in an internation-
al arena—along with a set of possible vulnerabilities 
associated with the exploitation of their sovereignty 
by others. While this essay focuses on unique 
sovereignty of Pacific Island micro-states, the anal-
ysis may hold relevance for many of the fifty-two 
nations that identify as Small Island Developing 
States (SIDS).
In the past, states needed physical means to defend 
and secure sovereignty. In a post-Westphalian era, 
sovereignty has become an innate and inviolable 
construct, allowing these microstates to continue 
to exist in spite of their relative weakness on a 
11. Rodd, Adrien. “Adapting 
postcolonial island societies: Fiji and 
the Solomon Islands in the Pacific.” 
Island Studies Journal 11, no. 2 
(2016): 505-520.
12. Baldacchino, Godfrey. Island 
enclaves: Offshoring strategies, 
creative governance, and subnational 
island jurisdictions. McGill-Queen’s 
Press-MQUP, 2010.
13. The EEZ was adopted during the 
Third United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea (1982). UNCLOS 
is an international agreement on 
oceanic rights and regulations.
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global scale. Historically sovereignty had to do with 
maintaining a source of power. When sovereignty 
exists without conventional metrics of power, how 
can a nation avoid being exploited? And how might 
micro-states leverage sovereignty in new ways? 
THE TRAPPINGS OF SOVEREIGNTY
As Pacific Island states established their sovereignty 
from colonial powers and formed governments 
using internationally recognized frameworks, they 
began to acquire additional benefits associated 
with recognized statehood. As a transnational legal 
construction, statehood comes with economic 
and social self-determination, the ability to issue 
passports, total sovereignty over native land and 
the earth below (with some self-imposed limita-
tions presented by United Nations conventions) 
and certain types of sovereignty over adjacent 
airspace and oceans. Perhaps one of the most pow-
erful devices granted by reciprocally recognized 
statehood is access to a seat in the United Nations 
generally assembly. To join the UN, a state must be 
approved by both the UN Security council and a 
two-thirds vote in the UN general assembly. Upon 
achieving their seat, a United Nations vote pro-
vides valuable clout relative to larger states which 
otherwise command significantly more power. In 
addition to political bargaining power, nationhood 
provides visibility on a global stage, allowing 
nations to call attention to plights in a way that 
typically would not be possible for ten or twenty 
thousand people absorbed into a larger national 
entity—which is perhaps why we hear almost as 
much media about climate change risks to Bangla-
desh as to Tuvalu, despite the fact that Bangladesh 
has millions at risk and Tuvalu only a few thousand.
Over time, evolving United Nations charters 
and conventions reshape the particular assets 
of statehood in the modern era. In 1982, the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) greatly expanded the territory—and 
such, the power—of Pacific Island nations through 
new mandates on national rights over surrounding 
oceans. UNCLOS stipulates a 200 nautical mile 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) offset of the 
shoreline of coastal nations.13 This allows nations 
the right to explore for and use marine resources 
including power production from wind or water, oil 
reserves, and most importantly for the Pacific, fish 
stocks. It does not allow any rights to the surface of 
the sea or above; ships from other nations can pass 
through an EEZ freely. For Nauru, one of the tiniest 
nations in the Pacific (and the world) in terms of 
both population and land area, the EEZ amounts to 
about 300,000 square kilometers; their territory 
was expanded by more than 10,000 times by virtue 
of a collection of signatures on paper.
Statehood is an institution, a legal framework for 
association created by reciprocal contracts between 
a collections of self-selecting, autonomous govern-
ments. The modern nation-state was created by and 
for the West, and as discussed above, tends towards 
isomorphism and attempts to make new mem-
ber-states in the image of the existing established 
‘nation-state’. However, the application of systems 
intended for geographically large and populous con-
tinental states to tiny islands and archipelagos of the 
Pacific fosters a sort of de-lamination of governance, 
where statehood as a transnational legal framework 
sometimes floats in loose association with the atolls 
and archipelagos of the Pacific.
MICRO SOVEREIGNTY AS CURRENCY
The former section established the unlikely context 
in which Pacific Island states, most with populations 
less than that of a small continental town or city, 
have become actors on an international stage. 
What does this sovereignty mean when a state 
has little if any export economy, no military, and 
few exploitable resources? With limited economic 
assets—and little capacity to harvest the assets they 
do have—Pacific Island nations have nimbly found 
ways to turn sovereignty itself into a form of curren-
cy, leveraging different aspects of their nation-state 
status in order to promote local development and 
maintain autonomy. Unconventional practices may 
even be essential to small island state development: 
“In spite of the mantra of sustainable development, 
islands fare best economically when they lure 
revenue from elsewhere, and the performance of 
their politicians is often appraised by how well 
they manage to secure such largesse.”14 Drawing on 
Easterling’s framings of “extrastatecraft” as alterna-
tives to, and hidden layers of, traditional statecraft,15 
microstatecraft refers to the activities of small island 
microstates made possible by the virtue of their 
geographic characteristics. In so defining, these 
cases in part seek to question framings of Pacific 
Island microstates as marginal rather understanding 
the islands, their populations, and their approaches 
to sovereignty as “fluid, multiple and complex.”16 
Microstatecrafts are savvy approaches to both cope 
with the risks associated with modernity, but also 
to find opportunity in the global framework Pacific 
island nations have been offered.
However, having the status of nationhood without 
the traditional metrics of force or cash as backing 
can also be a risk, operating as a kind of negative 
currency that is vulnerable to exploitation by more 
powerful peers. Thus, leveraging sovereignty in 
atypical—or even what might be considered un-
seemly ways—is not only a possibility, but may be a 
necessity for these microstates in an effort to stave 
off outside exploitation. Rather than “desperate 
14. Baldacchino, Godfrey. “Small 
Island States: Vulnerable, Resilient, 
Doggedly Perseverant or Cleverly 
Opportunistic?.” Études caribéennes 
27-28 (2014).
15. Easterling, Extrastatecraft.
16. Teaiwa, Teresia K. “Native thoughts: 
A Pacific Studies take on cultural 
studies and diaspora.” In Indigenous 
diasporas and dislocations, pp. 15-
36. Routledge, 2017.
17. Baldacchino, Island enclaves.
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measures taken by chronically vulnerable jurisdic-
tions” these activities are perhaps better understood 
as “expressions of creative governance, a fuller 
exploitation of political geography for economic or 
strategic gain,” in the words of Baldacchino.17 While 
his work on Islands and Enclaves has extensively 
explored how territorial exceptionalism is lever-
aged by subnational island jurisdictions and their 
metropoles, this paper is particularly interested in 
the opportunities created by sovereignty when not 
bound to a larger state power. The following cases 
illustrate the myriad ways in which Pacific Island 
nations have developed microstatecrafts which (for 
the most part) make the nation-state framework 
operate in their favor.
A number of acronym-heavy models have been 
developed to explain the ‘atypical’ economies of 
small island states. As early as 1985 Bertram & 
Watters developed the MIRAB model (Migration, 
Remittances, Aid, and Bureaucracy) to explain the 
post-colonial economic functioning of microstates 
in the “South Pacific.”18 This model continues to be 
adapted by academics to explain how small island 
nations persist without export economies.19 While 
migration and remittances are perhaps more tied 
to the crafts of individuals, aspects of the aid and 
bureaucracy components of the MIRAB model, as 
they related to (micro) statecrafts, are incorporated 
in the cases below. Similarly, Baldacchino’s PROFIT 
model (People considerations, Resource management, 
Overseas engagement and ultra-national recognition, 
Finance, Insurance, and taxation, and Transportation) 
20 while focused more on small island territories 
which may not be sovereign, corresponds to several 
of the microstatecrafts illustrated here. 
1. TAX HAVENS
Many independent Pacific Island nations have 
developed tax laws that attract large sums of 
foreign cash. Low, or no, tax rates attract outside 
investors to shelter incomes in these offshore sites, 
minimizing or eliminating taxes in their home 
jurisdiction. Offshore Finance Centers (OFCs), 
colloquially known as tax havens or tax shelters, 
often provide high levels of information protection 
as well; in some cases, even preventing clients from 
prosecution at home for tax evasion or making 
space for other forms of criminal activity to occur. 
The primary users of OFCs are transnational cor-
porations and extremely wealthy individuals.21 The 
minimal tax rates and fees that offshore banks levy 
can generate huge incomes relative to island econo-
mies. While flows of capital are global, taxes are still 
levied on national jurisdictions, and these sites have 
been able to leverage this intersection of market 
globalization and space through local policies. 
 While tax havens exist globally, they are 
particularly popular in small nations with weak 
economies, or in small semi-autonomous territories. 
Samoa, the Marshall Islands, the Cook Islands and 
Vanuatu are the largest tax havens in the Pacific, 
although there are an additional handful of minor 
players in the region. A recent ranking identified 
Samoa as the ‘most secretive’ of global tax havens. 
The Prime minister, Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi, 
explained their participation in off-shoring finance in 
this way: “For small economies with narrow revenue 
bases, Government leaders must always remain 
vigilant to use every opportunity available to them 
to raise revenue for development.”22 He argues that 
microstatecraft is necessary in order to participate in 
the global economy.
Tax havens have been represented as illicit economies 
or pseudo-development strategies.23 However, off-
shore financial centers are not illegal in and of them-
selves, rather, they create conditions that allow other 
actors to partake in semi-legal or illegal tax-sheltering 
activities (typically relative to home jurisdictions) as 
the local meets the global. As Palan observes, “tax 
havens are like the sovereign equivalent of parking lot 
proprietors: they could not care less about the busi-
ness of their customers, only that they pay for parking 
their vehicles there.”24 Following the global financial 
crisis, G8 and OECD countries have attempted to 
tighten a crackdown on OFCs, in some cases success-
fully. However, as economies in the East and Global 
South with more lenient attitudes on tax evasion 
increase in power, Pacific Island tax havens may 
become a more secure strategy for commodifying 
national sovereignty.
2. FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE
Pacific Island states, led by the Marshall Islands, also 
sell ‘Flags of Convenience’ as a form of sovereign-
ty-economy. Ocean-going vessels choose where to 
register their ships based upon which nations have 
the least taxes and fees, and most favorable laws and 
regulations. While at sea, they operate based on the 
laws established by the flag under which they are 
flying. With a population of only 70,000 people, the 
18. Bertram, G., & Watters, R. F. The 
MIRAB process: Earlier analyses in 
context. Pacific Viewpoint, 27 no. 1 
(1986): 47-59.
19. Overton, John, and Warwick E. 
Murray. “Sovereignty for Sale? 
Coping with Marginality in the 
South Pacific--the Example of Niue.” 
Croatian Geographical Bulletin 76, 
no. 1 (2014).
20. Baldacchino, Godfrey, “Engaging 
the Hinterland Beyond: Two 
Ideal-Type Strategies of Managing 
External Relations for Small Island 
Territories.” Paper presented to 
the conference Beyond MIRAB: 
The Political Economy of Small 
Island States in the 21st Century, 
Wellington, February 2004.
21. Hampton, M. P., & Christensen, 
J. Offshore pariahs? Small island 
economies, tax havens, and the 
re-configuration of global finance. 
World Development 30, no. 9, 
(2002): 1657-1673.
22. Quoted in: Tauafiafi, L. A. “SAMOA: 
Ranked No.1 as world’s most 
secretive tax haven, potential for 
more investors.” Pacific Guardian (15 
February 2015).
23. Baldacchino, “Small Island States.”
24. Palan, Ronen. “Tax havens and 
the commercialization of state 
sovereignty.” International 
organization 56, no. 1 (2002): 151-176.
25. Palan, Ronen. The offshore world: 
sovereign markets, virtual places, 
and nomad millionaires. Cornell 
University Press, 2006.
26. Van Fossen, Anthony. “Citizenship 
for sale: passports of convenience 
from Pacific island tax havens.” 
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Marshall Islands boasts the world’s third largest—
and fastest growing—ship registry. The registration 
scheme for both Marshall Islands and Panama 
flags of convenience is operated by International 
Registries Inc., in Reston, Virginia.25 These flags of 
convenience allow Pacific Island nations to trade in a 
kind of portable national space, trading in a market 
of temporary citizenship for ocean-going ships.
3. CITIZENSHIP FOR SALE
Actual citizenship is another intangible commodity 
of sovereignty from which Pacific Island nations 
can extract needed profit with little investment. 
Many Pacific Island nations have dabbled in pass-
port sales, including the Marshall Islands, Nauru, 
Vanuatu, Tuvalu, and Tonga, with varying degrees of 
legality relative to their own constitutions. Persons 
seeking these ‘passports of convenience’ are gen-
erally wealthy elite, and have been predominantly 
Chinese, seeking multiple national identities in 
service of tax avoidance, transnational mobility, 
foreign privileges at home (such as access to in-
ternational schools for their children), or alternate 
identities in service of past and future criminal 
activity. 26 The overall market of passport sales 
in the Pacific has been valued at $153,450,000. A 
new national identity will run you anywhere from 
$10,000 to $300,000 USD. 27 Following the 9/11 
terrorist attacks in the US, most legal venues for 
passport sales have been closed out by pressures 
from the West; however, it is likely ongoing off-the-
books at a smaller scale. Caribbean and Mediter-
ranean passport sales programs, which tend to be 
more formalized, sponsored by the government or 
run by foreign professional agencies, have proven 
more durable and may provide alternative models 
for structuring passport markets.28
The creation of a market for passports, from an eco-
nomically (neo) liberal perspective, can be seen as 
tracking towards a truly free-market world system: 
a “first step towards more complete deregulation.” 
29 It is ironic, then, that the Western purveyors of 
neoliberal ideologies are the strongest opponents to 
the passport market, demonstrating that nationalism 
remains an important component in the current 
system of global capitalism. However, free market 
citizenship can clearly be seen as a by-product 
of late capitalism, where the market extends into 
previously unimaginable spheres of our lives. Pacific 
Island nations have simply been nimble movers in 
the world system that has been imposed upon them.
4. ‘SINKING NATIONS’
In a global collective worldview, the status of na-
tionhood also holds symbolic value. It allows for 
visibility and identification on a global stage. Pacific 
Island nations at high risk for inundation due to 
climate change and sea level rise have leveraged this 
position to garner media attention, attracting aid and 
donations, and serve as a broader symbol for global 
carbon reduction. Tuvalu and Kiribati, nations com-
posed entirely of low-lying coral atolls, have been 
two of the loudest spoken-nations against climate 
change and resulting sea level rise. At the recent 
COP 21 conference in Paris, Tuvalu Prime Minister 
Enele Sopoaga stated:
 For a country like Tuvalu, our survival  
 depends on the decisions we take at this  
 conference. Let me emphasize this point.  
 Our survival as a nation depends on the  
 decisions we take at this conference. This  
 is not a simply stepping-stone to a better  
 future. We stand on a cliff edge. Either we  
 stand united and agree to combat climate  
 change or we all stumble and fall and  
 condemn humanity to a tragic future.30 
In addition to serving as an exchangeable com-
modity, here, statehood plays a role in global 
representations and media as a vulnerable ‘sinking’ 
nation that can only be saved by pre-emptive 
actions on the part of the rest of the world. While 
certainly vulnerable to climate change, Tuvalu and 
Kiribati share that vulnerability with thousands of 
coastal communities around the globe; however, 
attached to larger states with more complex global 
identities, the plights of many of these at at-risk 
communities remain less visible. Framing their risk 
not as the survival of a collection of villages, but the 
‘survival as a nation’ paints a striking picture in a 
global imaginary.
These ‘canary in the coal mine’31 representations 
perform a kind of dual microstatecraft: first, as 
an attempt to influence global greenhouse gas 
emissions. Atoll nations in particular have become 
sharply visible spokes-nations at global climate 
change negotiations, such as their visible shaping 
of the COP21 dialogue and Paris Agreement.32 For a 
broader media-consuming world public, they have 
helped create the imagery of the climate refugee, a 
visible reminder of who will suffer, or even drown, 
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without the conscious reduction of carbon footprints 
by individuals in disparate locations. 
Second, the imaginary of the ‘sinking nation’ has 
played an important role in increasing aid funding 
for low-lying island nations. In a study of bilateral 
adaptation aid, Betzold and Weiler found that 
vulnerable small island states see particularly high 
levels of adaptation aid per capita,33 and Robinson 
and Dornan similarly show that states with SIDs 
status receive relatively higher levels of aid, all other 
factors being equal.34 The climate change crisis has 
made small island nations into poster-child aid ben-
eficiaries, who benefit not only from the projects, but 
also from an increase in waged positions associated 
with the bureaucracy, labor, and services supporting 
these projects. Global and regional aid organizations 
may even compete for the ability to be involved 
in adaptation projects in atoll nations. Some have 
argued that the role of atoll nations as a symbol of 
climate change or experimental site for adaptation 
disenfranchises its citizens, or even justifies Tuvalu 
(and possibly other atoll nations) as “expendable”—
after all, the canary must die to serve as an alarm.35 
While Farbotko’s illustration of an “eco-colonial 
gaze” is well justified, it does not negate the nation’s 
capacity to simultaneously leverage its representa-
tion as a ‘disappearing state’ to local advantage. 
The sinking nation imagery has also had unexpected 
side-effects. Listicles, such as “25 Places you should 
visit before they vanish from the face of the earth”36 
have provided boosts to tourism as adventurers 
seekers aim to explore islands before they are sub-
merged, even though nations like Tuvalu and Kiribati 
have very little tourism infrastructure. This has the 
potential for negative impacts as well: Wrighton 
and Overton have documented how donor-related 
consultation has placed a considerable burden on 
small island states with limited institutional infra-
structure.37 There is a similar potential for tourism 
to place a strain on limited resources (food, energy, 
space, waste); however, if island states are able to 
prepare there is significant financial value that can 
be captured from this emergent tourism.
5. SPACES OF EXCEPTION
The currency of sovereignty can also be exploited 
or inverted, becoming a kind of negative currency. 
In the same way that semi-autonomous offshore 
territories of powerful nations can be exploited as 
military/detention sites, tax havens, and exclusive 
economic zones, weak or desperate independent 
states also risk exploitation through similar mech-
anisms. Powerful nations can use offshore, ex-situ 
sites as zones for operations that would not be 
admissible or in their own sovereign territories. In 
the past, this was achieved through colonialism and 
explicit force, as with the testing of nuclear bombs 
across various atolls during the Cold War, most 
famously the lagoon bomb site at Bikini Atoll in the 
Marshall Islands, 1946-1958.38 While today these 
nations have established sovereignty, a Compact of 
Free Association between the US and the Federated 
States of Micronesia (FSM), the Marshall Islands, 
and the Republic of Palau allows the US to maintain 
autonomous military bases on island soils in ex-
change for military protections and favorable mi-
gration policies. The Compact has also allowed the 
US to effectively forgo clean-up for the more than 
50 nuclear bombs they detonated in the Marshall 
Islands.39 Despite their seats in the UN, the power 
structure created by the Compact has led a number 
of scholars to consider these three nations as “effec-
tively non-sovereign.”40
Nauru provides an even more dramatic example. 
During the colonial era, the single raised coral island 
of Nauru was exploited as a site of phosphate extrac-
tion by foreign, primarily Australian, administering 
authorities. As a result of strip-mining activities, 
more than 80% of the surface of the island-state has 
been heavily degraded and made uninhabitable. 
When the phosphate ran out in recent decades, 
Nauru’s economy effectively collapsed, leading 
some to suggest that it had become a “failed state.”41 
In 2001, as part of their “Pacific Solution” to a 
(perceived) influx of African and Middle Eastern 
refugees, Australia entered into a deal with Nauru to 
operate one of three off-shore asylum sites as part 
of a strategy to disincentive refugees from seeking 
access to Australian soil by boat. With a struggling 
economy originating from Australian exploitative 
mining practices, Nauru acquiesced to the arrange-
ment. The Nauru Regional Processing Center, op-
erated from 2001-2007 and 2012-present has been 
the site of numerous human rights violations against 
refugees. Violent and exploitative actions are made 
possible by a “space of exception”,42 where the camps 
exist on Nauruan sovereign soils but are operated 
under Australian authority. In this way, Australia, 
and the private contractors who operate the camp, 
are able to exercise full control over the camps and 
exploit prisoners in ways that would be unconsti-
tutional on their own ground. A similar model is 
applied by the U.S. in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.43 
In these cases, sovereignty is a negative currency 
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for Pacific Island states; an asset to be exploited 
by foreign powers, a pawn to larger global power 
struggles or capital accumulation. A more strategic 
leveraging of other forms of sovereignty-currency 
might help island nations to avoid this sort of ex-
ceptional exploitation.
6. AID FOR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
It has been established above that an essential 
metric for achieving the status of nation is being 
recognized by other nations as such. Thus, another 
powerful tool of Pacific Island microstates is the 
ability, through this reciprocity mechanism, to help 
validate prospective nation-states that might actu-
ally be much more powerful and wealthy than their 
Pacific Island boosters. Stringer puts it succinctly: 
“With their sovereignty, these states can benefit 
themselves economically using their diplomatic 
power to negotiate the terms of their international 
relationships.”44 This model appears most visibly in 
the Pacific in the struggle for international recog-
nition between the People’s Republic of China and 
Taiwan. At the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, 
the Nationalist government of China retreated to 
the island of Taiwan as the communists took power. 
The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) regards 
Taiwan as a rebel region and has contributed to 
its displacement as a national power; Taiwan lost 
its seat in the UN in 1971. In efforts to regain its 
nation-state status, Taiwan sought out recognition 
from other sovereign nation-states, typically in 
return for reciprocal aid or trade. Presently, Taiwan 
is recognized by twenty-two nations (Australian 
Government DFAT), including five Pacific Island 
nations: Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, 
and Tuvalu. 
At the same time that Taiwan has offered aid and 
other rewards in exchange for recognition, The 
PRC has attempted to sway nations to recognize 
One China through similar means.45 Many Pacific 
Island nations have manipulated this diplomatic 
love triangle to their own advantage, swapping 
recognition as the opposing party sweetens the 
deal. For example, Taiwan loaned Palau $20 million 
for the construction of their new capital city46 and 
donated the imposing three-story government 
center in Tuvalu, the nation’s largest and most 
modern building by significant measure. Strategic 
policies on China/Taiwan have allowed Pacific 
Island nations to extract multiple benefits from both 
governments; Kiribati, Nauru, Vanuatu, and Tonga 
have all switched allegiances in efforts to maximize 
their diplomatic advantage. For example, in 2002 
Nauru, initially an ally of Taiwan, recognized ‘One 
China’ in exchange for $150 million in aid and debt 
relief. In 2005, Nauru switched back to recognizing 
Taiwan; although no visible funding was received in 
exchange, Wikileaks recently revealed Taiwan was 
paying cash directly to Nauruan members of par-
liament. While some used this cash to benefit their 
districts more broadly, others simply pocketed the 
sum. The MP’s were being paid only around $5,000 
per month; a huge sum for impoverished Nauru, 
but a cheap price to buy national sovereignty on 
the part of Taiwan.47 More recently, Nauru also 
recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia (breakaway 
regions of Georgia) in exchange for—ostensibly 
unrelated—generous aid donations. 
In these cases, sovereignty is an asset in its ability 
to beget sovereignty for other prospective na-
tion-states. While these are diplomatic relations 
that can be leveraged for the benefit of the entire 
recognizing nations, the Nauru case also suggests 
that there is a risk of corruption in these non-tradi-
tional models associated with microstatecraft.
7. COALITIONS AND ALLIANCES
It has already been established that sovereign 
nations successfully admitted into the United 
Nations gain the added benefit of a voting seat 
in the United Nations General Assembly. While 
this vote and voice is valuable in and of itself, it 
becomes a true force of microstatecraft when UN 
member nations align their positions and votes in 
the UN towards shared interests and agendas. For 
Pacific Island nations, the most significant alliance 
is the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), founded in 1971 
as the South Pacific Forum. This intergovernmental 
organization is an official observer of the UN, and 
its member nations occupy sixteen of the 193 seats 
in the General Assembly, yet only represent .5% of 
the global population. Michael Powles remarks on 
how significant these voting blocs can be:
Numbers count at the UN. The General 
Assembly and the Economic and Social 
Council, with their various committees 
and subsidiary bodies, are nothing 
if not democratic, to the occasional 
ill-conceived chagrin of the UN’s larger 
members, some of whom remain uncom-
fortable with the ‘one state one vote’ rule 
which underpins the universality of the 
United Nations.48 
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These votes can then be pooled towards shared 
Pacific Island objectives, particularly sustainable 
development and climate mitigation and adaptation 
agendas. Some past successes of the forum within the 
UN framework include establishing a provision for 
holding a global conference on the interests of small 
island developing states during the 1992 United 
Nations Conference on Environment; re-inscribing 
New Caledonia on the UN list of non-self-governing 
territories; and shaping the 1982 Convention on the 
Law of the Seas in terms that were favorable to in-
terests of Pacific Island nations.49 For climate-change 
related issues, PIF defers to AOSIS, or the Alliance of 
Small Island States. With 42 UN seats, AOSIS exerts 
an even stronger pull; the alliance was established in 
1990 with the specific agenda of exerting increased 
influence during the UN Convention on Climate 
Change (UNCCC) in the interest of small island 
states particularly vulnerable to climate change and 
seal level rise. 50 Together they have initiated the 
Barbados Programme of Action for the Sustainable 
Development of Small Island Developing States. 
Initially launched in 1994 and signed by 125 nations, 
it establishes regional and local action programs 
to improve climate change adaptation through UN 
organization. At COP 21, a coalition between AOSIS 
and the Least Developed Countries (LDC) group 
helped establish ambitious goals within the Paris 
Agreement, including the 1.5°C maximum target for 
global warming.
8. ISLAND JURISDICTIONS
The rejection of sovereignty can also be a tool of 
microstatecraft. Island jurisdictions, often remnants 
of the colonial era, in recent decades strive to retain 
their dependency statuses, in spite of attempts by 
their metropole benefactors to shed their offshore 
territories. Overton and Murray note that “small 
states may in practice ‘sell’ their sovereignty—or 
aspects of it—in order to secure greater benefits 
from large metropolitan powers”; for example, 
Niue’s 1974 referendum decision to become a 
self-governing state in free association with New 
Zealand appears to have created more opportunities 
for the island-nation rather than remaining a territo-
ry or becoming an independent state.51 In addition to 
the support, aid, and negotiating power New Zealand 
provides, residents of Niue benefit from the power of 
a New Zealand passport, allowing free movement in 
both New Zealand and Australia. In contrast, citizens 
of independent Pacific Island states, except those in 
free association with the US, may find themselves 
trapped by impotent passports. This condition of 
“upside down decolonization”—actively embraced 
by the residents of territories including Tokelau, 
Niue, the Cook Islands, Puerto Rico, and the US 
Virgin Islands who have all voted to remain as ter-
ritories in recent decades—perpetuates the colonial 
relationship, to the chagrin of the UN Special Com-
mittee on Decolonization.52
However, rather than trading-in their sovereignty 
entirely, subnational island jurisdictions enjoy 
varying degrees of autonomy. As enclaves of their 
metropole state, they are still able to employ a 
number of microstatecraft tactics. Keller Easter-
ling, in her toolkit of the infrastructure spaces of 
extrastatecraft, describes the ‘zone’ (the Export 
Processing Zone and its progeny) as trading “state 
bureaucracy for even more complex layers of extra 
state governance, market manipulation, and regula-
tion.” Islands and colonial remnants are popular sites 
for zones, some of which “merge the island resort 
with the offshore financial center.”53 Zone users and 
occupants enjoy a number of incentives, including 
relaxed environmental laws, access to cheap labor 
and land, and even “quasi-diplomatic immunities.” 
In this condition of “sovereign bifurcation”54 subna-
tional island jurisdictions can deploy microstatecraft 
just as zones operationalize extrastatecraft while still 
benefitting from affiliation with and legitimization by 
a larger state.
Yet, this tradeoff is inherently made on unequal 
terms, and island jurisdictions can also suffer as 
a result of their non-integrated status. This was 
most recently (and violently) illustrated by the US 
response to Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico, where 
mainland-centric regulations including the Jones 
Act, inability to declare bankruptcy, and FEMA 
eligibility guidelines, (as well as cultural, social, and 
language barriers) have slowed the disaster response 
and occluded many from receiving much-needed 
assistance. Disruptions of stability by climate change 
may call tradeoffs associated with other subnational 
relationships into question as well.
9. ETCETERA…
The clever leveraging of sovereignty-related assets 
does not end with the above list. Pacific Island 
nations have branded their tropical identities for 
the sale of local products; they have sold off their 
internet domain names (notably Tuvalu’s catchy ‘.tv’ 
moniker) for large sums; they have sold space for 
strategic military bases and telecommunications 
infrastructure; they leverage their UN-mandated 
exclusive economic zones to sell fishing licenses to 
larger nations with better fishing fleets (tuna fishing 
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in the Pacific is a $4 billion dollar industry), and they 
have even earned income from space, by claiming 
and monetizing orbital satellite slots.55 The strategies 
vary across nations, and this paper recognizes that 
the economies, cultures, degrees of development, 
and even geographies of Pacific island nations are 
quite diverse. However, they share the microstate 
typology that affords relatively small and poor states 
a distinct form of influence on an international stage. 
This operationalization of sovereignty perhaps 
even helps to reject the imaginary of Pacific Island 
microstates as small and marginalized spaces: by 
leveraging their unique geo-political characteristics 
via microstatecraft, they have come to play a signifi-
cant role in the workings of the neoliberal world—it 
has been estimated that half of the world’s money 
passes through offshore tax havens.56 Understanding 
and operating within a condition of flux is essential 
to the inhabitation of an Oceanic world; as Tongan/
Fijian Scholar Epeli Hau’Ofa has prominently 
argued, the occupants of the region traditionally 
saw their realm not only as “tiny islands” but rather 
a broader universe of navigable oceans, underworld 
deities, and heavenly constellations as guides to the 
world below.57 Rather than inhabiting flows of water, 
contemporary microstatecraft conceives Pacific 
island microstates as adept navigators of the flows of 
global capital. While perhaps not powerful enough 
to control the movement of oceans or the global 
financial superstructure, the residents of Oceania 
have adapted to both mediums, finding ways to make 
the powerful flows propel their (-)crafts.
MICROSTATECRAFT FUTURES
Microstatecrafts illustrate Teresia Teaiwa’s claim that 
Pacific Islanders have “with surprising frequency 
outwitted—if not outstripped—their competitors in 
the race which has been modernity.”58 This collection 
of cases suggests a new potential understanding 
of sovereignty in the era of late capitalism. When 
everything is commodified, sovereignty too embod-
ies attributes that can be bought and sold by states 
who have few conventional products to offer in the 
global marketplace. The complex political maneu-
vers undertaken by Pacific Island micro-states, 
discussed above, serve to illustrate the delicate 
nature of contemporary geopolitical structures in 
the context of global capitalism; statehood systems 
designed to ensure global stability become exploit-
able commodities. Palan observes that tax havens 
demonstrate “the manner by which the modern 
state system not only accommodates globalization 
but also produces in subtle ways the infrastructure 
of globalization”59: microstatecraft is a fundamental 
component of existing world systems. While this 
paper has focused on microstatecraft cases from 
Oceania, this holds true for many other island states, 
from the tax havens in the Caribbean to the passport 
sales of the Mediterranean.
Pacific Island nations have been able to bargain with 
statehood in new ways in recent decades, however 
there is also possible risk for microstates where non-
state actors, corporations, or other entities without the 
best interests of associated citizens, begin to operate 
straw man nations towards more nefarious ends. 
Corrupt local leaders can sell state attributes towards 
personal gains without minding dangerous fallout for 
their countries. And many of the these microstate-
crafts, from tax havens to flags of convenience, have 
been frowned upon by larger nations. Some have 
argued that island states may be in fact better off as 
semi-autonomous jurisdictions of larger nations who 
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can provide protections and support systems.60 Yet, 
many Oceanic states have chosen to become and stay 
independent in recent decades, suggesting that for at 
least some island states, sovereignty is valued over 
the assurances that a metropole can provide. Micro-
statecraft is a form of survival for small island, big 
ocean states where forces ranging from capitalism 
to climate change to neo-imperialism are constant 
threats, but it might be seen as itself a form of ac-
tivism towards the right of oceanic states to operate 
autonomously and make their own rules within 
these larger systems. In her study of extrastatecraft, 
Easterling suggests that activism might benefit from 
activities outside and beyond the norm: 
Just as many of the most powerful regimes 
in the world find it expedient to operate 
with proxies and doubles in infrastructure 
space, the most familiar forms of activism 
might similarly benefit from using undis-
closed partners or unorthodox auxiliaries, 
if only to soften up the ground and offer a 
better chance of success.61
In Easterling’s framing, alternative strategies for ac-
tivism are made necessary by the pervasiveness and 
potency of global capitalism. Similarly, microstate-
crafts, beyond traditional forms of statecraft, can 
be seen as tools to combat the powerful and often 
ex-colonial states whose activities—greenhouse gas 
production, international regulations, capitalist ex-
pansion—limit the capacity of small island states and 
peoples to thrive, or even exist. For Pacific Island 
nations who have historically been at the mercy of 
colonial powers, and in some cases continue to ex-
perience the ramifications of neocolonial activities, 
the use of microstatecrafts advocates that the right to 
exist independently and participate in global systems 
need not be a function of territorial, economic, or 
militaristic scales. Deploying such tactics as offshore 
banking, passport sales, and UN voting coalitions 
allow island nations to re-define what sovereignty 
means in their own terms, leveling the playing field 
in a West-centric world. Sovereign archipelagoes 
and their inhabitants can use microstatecrafts as 
tools to advocate for their own well-being in a world 
system which currently, through climate destruction, 
globalization, and capitalist expansion, seems set to 
destroy them.
Island microstates are “active forms,”62 their ge-
ographic components corresponding to series of 
regulations, flows, and virtual networks. While the 
post-colonial nation-state framework has subdivided 
the Pacific into discrete geographic units, the re-
gion’s fluid history suggests the potency of projects 
which exceed state boundaries, engaging in larger 
flows. As a region, many interests are shared in the 
Pacific: adapting to climate change, improving the 
mobility of citizens, retaining cultural practices in a 
globalizing world, and economic development. The 
work of PIF/AOSIS suggests that perhaps the most 
powerful currency of sovereignty in island micro-
states is the formation of coalitions toward shared 
agendas. In an age where disasters and displace-
ment associated with changing climates reigns as a 
primary concern for Pacific Island nations, strength-
ening relationships such as AOSIS and PIF may be 
essential tactics towards securing ongoing self-de-
termination through affiliation. Perhaps even a new 
Pacific Union is in order, one which re-introduces 
the islander mobilities disrupted by the Westphalian 
state and modern passport. Subverting frameworks 
designed by and for the benefit of Western powers, 
Pacific Island micro-states can expand upon the 
currencies of sovereignty, using microstatecraft to 
expand Oceanic agency on a global stage.
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